Blog
Post 1: The “Frustrating” Senate
By
Rudolph Zombek
On September
14, 2019 The NY Times article titled “The Senate: Still
Great at Deliberating, but Less So at Legislating” by Carl Hulse proved to be a
very timely and appropriate read because of topics discussed in class as a
current legislative issue. The title of the article really says it all as the
common complaint from both progressive and conservative pundits has been
focused on the Senate’s ability to “deliberate” over topics but the question
may be asked, ”Is anyone really listening to the deliberative process in the
Senate when it comes to reaching compromise to pass legislation?”
In
the decade’s defining “do nothing” sessions of Congress, the answer to that
question would appear to be no (Figure 1). First it was the Republican’s turn
from 2011-2017 to stymie six of President Obama’s eight years in the White
House and after only two years of unified government the Democrats have their
chance to halt Republican legislation that starts in the Senate and make it
dead on arrival in the House. The opposite happens with House bills being dead
on arrival when they reach the Senate which leads to a deadlocked congress and
no legislation being passed. The only thing that the Senate can seem to do is
pass President Trump’s judicial and executive branch nominees into positions of
influence with the House unable to stop the nominations (Hulse, 2018).
Indeed,
very little legislation makes it to President Trump’s desk for the possibility
of signing into law, frustrating liberal and progressive voters throughout the
country. Hulse has reported that moderate Senator Susan Collins (R, ME) has
stated “I’m very eager to turn
from nominations to legislation, there are important issues that are pending,
and I think we could produce some terrific bills that would be signed into law”
(Hulse, 2018).
So beyond just frustrating liberals
and progressives, the structure of how the Senate operates as outlined in
Article I of the Constitution seems to be frustrating moderates in both the
major parties who want to solve current issues with legislation such as gun
control, healthcare, and immigration. Senator Jeff Merkley (D, OR) points squarely
to Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell (R, KY) to be the stonewall
of progress stating, “McConnell wants to protect his members from having to
take a vote on issues that are important to America” (Hulse, 2018).
But, how does the Senate seem to have this vast
obstructionist power? As mentioned previously,
it’s the design of the Senate in Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution,
“The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof, for six
Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.” (US Constitution, Article I,
Section 3,1789 rev. 1993)
The choice of
two representatives per state today is still controversial. Madison laid out
his reasoning of equal representation of the States in Federalist No. 62, “that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple
league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the
common councils” (Madison, 1788). Madison’s reasoning was justified in
1788, as the States were more like independent nations joining into an alliance
more than as a single nation and to this day the principal of federalism as
laid out in the Constitution gives the States as varied in population and dissimilar
in operations at the state level could be represented equally at the national
level.
Jeffery Toobin points that “the distortion created by
small states having an equal number of senators has dramatically worsened over
the centuries” with Virginia having “11 times many people” in 1787 in
proportion to Delaware and California having “70 times as many people” as Wyoming
(Toobin, 2013). Someone like Toobin or Levinson who believe the “Senate to be
the original sin” (Toobin, 2013), would prefer to have more democratic responsiveness
for the people, which would resemble a more centralized government that has a unicameral
legislature in structure and eliminate the representation of the states as an
entity to their own.
On the opposite end of the spectrum Toobin speaks of conservative pundit
Mark Levin would actually desire more representation to the States to take away
popular election of Senators by “repealing the 17th Amendment”
and that “the
original purpose of the Senate was to give state legislators a say in the
national government, and that’s gone” (Toobin, 2013). This level of
repression of the popular will is problematic in that it would make the country
less democratic and give more power to the States and the power elite to suppress
clamor for reform. The ideal of the 17th Amendment is to make the
Senate less aristocratic whilst still maintaining the structure of federalism
to prevent tyranny of the majority as envisioned by both Hamilton and Madison
upon the framing of the Constitution.
Though
the Senate frustrates progressives and reactionary conservatives such as Toobin,
Levinson, and Levin alike, the Senate also functions to reduce such extremism
by design. Madison wrote in Federalist 10 that the “mischief of faction” would
be minimized in representative government particularly different factions on a
state by state basis saying, “The influence of
factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be
unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”
(Madison, 1787)
It is with this principle of preventing mischief of faction
that Hamilton agreed with Madison to prevent anyone state from dominating the
others in the tedious union that had just been formed. Madison says that the Senate
served to pass laws “first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a
majority of the States” because the United States was a “compound republic” not
a “simple republic” (Madison, 1788). This compound republic as a
concept espouses the role of federalism where each individual state could
operate as they willed, so long as it did not violate the higher law of the Constitution.
The Senate, therefore, serves as a check and balance of the legislature for
preservation of the Union.
The Senate then, is fundamental in a federal system of government
in which the states can act autonomously in their affairs if not explicitly outlined
in the Constitution and its amendments. To make major change, either radical or
reactionary to the Constitution requires overwhelming consensus in both the
Congress and the State Legislatures which would benefit a mind such as Levin. However,
with the 17th Amendment the popularly elected Senate is therefore
more representative of the people in helps minds such as Toobin and Levinson. It
is in these principles that deliberation and compromise must take place in the
Senate to pass any legislation. The fundamental problem does not lay in the
structure of the Senate but by the people in the Senate who will not budge an
inch. However frustrating as the Senate may be, it does both prevent the
tyranny of majority and the mischief of faction to not make the Union unstable
nor too radical or reactionary.
References
Hulse, Carl. “The Senate: Still Great at Deliberating,
but Less So at Legislating “. NY Times. New York, NY.
September 14, 2019. Accessed on September 16, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/us/politics/senate-legislation.html
Madison, James. 1787. The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton
L. Rossiter. New York, NY. New
American Library. 1961. No. 10
Madison, James. 1788. The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton
L. Rossiter. New York, NY. New
American Library. 1961. No. 62
Singer,
Paul. Reale, Hannah. Judem, Emily. “Congress
May Be on Track to Achieve Historic Levels of Nothing”. WBGH, Boston NPR.
Boston, MA. September 8, 2019. Accessed on September 16, 2019 https://www.wgbh.org/news/politics/2019/09/08/congress-may-be-on-track-to-achieve-historic-levels-of-nothing
Toobin, Jeffery. “Our Broken Constitution”. The New Yorker.
New York, NY. December 1, 2013. Accessed on September 16, 2019 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/our-broken-constitution
United States Constitution. 1789 rev. 1993. Article I, Section 3. United States.
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